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 FILMING THE POLICE AS AN ACT OF 
RESISTANCE 
REMARKS GIVEN AT THE “SMARTPHONED” 
SYMPOSIUM 
BY JOCELYN SIMONSON1 
Good morning everyone and thank you so much for having me here 
today. The last few years have seen an unprecedented rise in the public nature 
of acts of civilian recording of police officers. Think, for example, of the 
videos of the choking of Eric Garner on Staten Island or the shooting of 
Walter Scott in North Carolina.  Each of those videos quickly became a part 
of the national conversation around police violence, revealing to privileged 
audiences the racialized nature of everyday police violence.  Although the 
function of civilian recordings of the police in the public sphere is an 
important one, today I am going to talk less about the importance of videos 
of police conduct, and more about the act of filming itself – the act of taking 
out a smartphone and pointing it at a police officer who is doing police work 
in public. I am going to argue that the act of filming itself is an act of 
expression, protected by the First Amendment, whether or not a video is ever 
viewed after it is taken. 
Two weeks ago today, a federal district court in Philadelphia issued an 
opinion holding that there is no First Amendment right to film the police.2  
That decision, Fields, consolidated two Section 1983 cases together, in which 
plaintiffs sued the police department of the City of Philadelphia for violating 
their First Amendment rights by arresting them for filming the police in 
public.  One plaintiff was a man who was walking down the street and 
decided to take out his cell phone and film police officers across the street 
outside of a party because it was “interesting,” and the other plaintiff was a 
 
 1.  Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School. These remarks were given at the March 2016 
symposium, “Smartphoned,” at the St. Thomas School of Law.  They are based in large part on 
arguments that I have made in two related articles, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. REV. 391 (2016), and 
Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 
2016). 
 2.  Fields v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 14-4424, 2016 WL 2754014 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 
2016). 
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woman who was a legal observer at an anti-fracking protest. Judge Kearney 
of the District of Philadelphia consolidated the cases, and said in direct 
opposition to other federal courts who had heard similar issues before that 
there is not a First Amendment right to record.  The court’s words were: “[w]e 
find no basis to craft a new First Amendment right based solely on ‘observing 
and recording’ [the police in public] without expressive conduct.”3  In other 
words, without additional expressive conduct – e.g., words or actions – 
filming the police is not on its own protected by the First Amendment. 
There was a fair amount of surprise in reaction to this decision, in part 
because Circuit Courts who have addressed whether there is a right to record 
have, for the most part, found that such a right does exist.4 (Admittedly, 
though, the Third Circuit, which governs Philadelphia, has held that there is 
not a clearly established right to record in the Circuit – the standard in a 1983 
suit.)5  But Judge Kearney did not say that there is not a clearly established 
right, he said there is no right. And many commentators have argued that the 
judge got it wrong.6  I agree, and most courts outside of the Third Circuit 
would agree.  When commentators have said that this case got it wrong, they 
have done so using a particular argument.  It is the same argument that the 
First Circuit and the Seventh Circuit and other federal appellate courts have 
used when they have held that there is a First Amendment right to record.  
That leading argument says that to take out a phone and make a film or 
photograph of the police is similar to gathering news or spending money on 
a political campaign, which makes filming protected conduct because it is 
ancillary to speech.  Here, for example, are the words of the First Circuit: 
“gathering information about government officials in a form that can be 
readily disseminated to others serves a cardinal first amendment interest in 
protecting and promoting the free discussion of governmental affairs.”7  This 
theory of why filming the police is protected activity holds that, just like 
gathering news or donating to a political cause, which are not speech in 
themselves, filming the police is so essential to preparing to engage in 
protected speech that it is protected by the First Amendment. 
Surely that argument is correct, and the Fields court was wrong to reject 
it.  But my concern with the leading cases and commentary, and especially 
my concern now as the Fields decision heads to the Third Circuit on appeal, 
 
 3.  Id. at *1. 
 4.  See ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 
F.3d 78, 85 (1st Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 F. 
App’x 721, 722 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (First Amendment right to take photos of police). 
 5.  See Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 6.  See, e.g., Shahid Butler & Sophia Cope, Court’s Decision on Recording Police Erodes 
First Amendment Rights and Transparency While Inviting Violence, available at 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/decision-eroding-first-amendments-rights-civil-rights-
transparency-inviting-violence. 
 7.  Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
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is that the leading cases skip over the possibility that filming the police can 
be a form of expression in itself, rather than just something that is preparatory 
to disseminating a recording at a later time.  
So what I want to argue today is that filming itself is an act of expression.  
I begin by discussing a manner of recording the police that is hard to deny is 
a form of expression.  I begin with organized copwatching.  Organized 
copwatching occurs when groups of residents of a particular neighborhood 
go on patrols together to film police officers on duty, often wearing matching 
t-shirts, holding visible recording devices, and engaging in conversations 
with civilians and police officers alike as they film.  Copwatching has a 
strong history among African-American communities; here is a picture of a 
Watts community patrol in 1966 in Los Angeles that went around with cars, 
using notepads rather than cameras to record police activity.  And the Black 
Panthers famously engaged in organized copwatching by patrolling police 
officers on duty while holding guns.  Since then, and especially in the last 
few years, copwatching groups have grown in both number and prominence 
around the United States.  Here are some pictures of groups in St. Louis and 
Ferguson, that were founded in the summer of 2014, shortly after the birth of 
the #BlackLivesMatter movement. And then here is a picture of an 
organization here in Minneapolis, Communities United Against Police 
Brutality, which was founded in 2000.  This Minneapolis group has been 
doing organizing against police brutality, not just here in the city, but 
throughout the state, and they also have organized copwatching patrols.  The 
mission of Communities United Against Police Brutality is this: “our 
overriding goal is to create a climate of resistance to abusive authority by 
police organizations, and to empower local people with a structure that can 
take on police brutality and actually bring it to an end.”  The reason I read 
you this mission statement is to make the point that copwatching 
organizations often made to me when I interviewed them for a study that I 
conducted.  The point is that organized copwatchers have a purpose beyond 
the prevention of police misconduct in the moment and the preservation of 
videos for future dissemination; they also engage in copwatching as a form 
of power building and power shifting – as a form of resistance to police 
authority over their neighborhoods.  In other words: a form of expression.8 
I have here on this slide a picture of a man named Kevin Moore, who 
lives in Baltimore and was a friend of Freddie Gray.  Mr. Moore is the 
individual who took out his camera and filmed Freddie Gray being arrested.  
Since that time, Mr. Moore has become an activist against police brutality in 
Baltimore and an activist in favor of using the tactic of copwatching to 
prevent police violence.9  In this picture here you can see that Mr. Moore is 
 
 8.  For an extended discussion along these lines and the results of Professor Simonson’s study 
of copwatching groups, see generally Simonson, Copwatching, supra note 1 . 
 9.  For more on Kevin Moore, see http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-md-
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wearing a “Copwatch” T-shirt, holding up a camera that is directed at us, the 
viewer of the photograph.  The best way that I can describe his facial 
expression is that he appears determined. I would argue this act that we see 
here – pointing a video camera at us, if you imagine that we are police 
officers, is inherently expressive. 
I am not sure that even the district court in Philadelphia would deny that 
if you had someone like Kevin Moore, wearing a copwatch t-shirt, standing 
in front of a police officer, part of a larger movement against police brutality, 
possibly questioning the officer verbally, those actions all together would 
constitute expressive conduct.  That conduct is probably expression such that, 
unless it is interfering with something the police officers are doing or 
undermining public safety, will be protected by the First Amendment. But 
what the court in Philadelphia said is that just filming alone is not itself 
expression. So I want us to imagine that in this picture Kevin Moore is not 
wearing a copwatch t-shirt and that he has not spoken or used an expressive 
facial expression.  Imagine that Mr. Moore is simply holding up a phone and 
pointing it at a police officer.  My argument today is that because of the 
history of filming police officers in our country – both the history of patrols 
by African-Americans during the civil rights movement and the recent 
history of anti-police brutality actions involving cameras – you cannot hold 
up a camera in front of a police officer without it being a political act or an 
act of dissent, or at least invoking in our larger culture those political acts and 
acts of dissent. 
There is some First Amendment precedent for this idea that observation 
can be a form of expression in itself, and that observation can also be a kind 
of dissent, especially in the relationship of police officers and the public.  
There is a robust jurisprudence in the Supreme Court surrounding the First 
Amendment right to observe courtroom proceedings.  And that jurisprudence 
emphasizes not only the eventual dissemination of information gathered at 
those proceedings, but also the act of observing in the moment. The Court 
has said: “the value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually 
attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being 
observed. The sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance 
that established procedures are being followed, and that deviations will 
become known.”10  In other words, to observe public officials doing their 
work in public is itself a powerful gesture because it is holding public 
officials accountable in the moment, because just being observed on its own 




 10.  Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); see also 
Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 
2197–2200 (2014) (discussing the First Amendment values behind the Supreme Court’s public trial 
cases). 
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Houston v. Hill, cursing at police officers is protected conduct because “the 
freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police actions without 
thereby risking arrest is one of the principle characteristics by which we 
distinguish a free nation from a police state.”11  If you combine these two 
ideas – one, that observation is itself a form of expression and two, that our 
First Amendment protects the ability to contest police actions in the moment, 
then you can arrive at the conclusion that just to hold up a camera in front of 
a police officer is itself a form of expression.12  
It matters whether we think about recording the police as preparatory to 
speech or as an act of expression itself.  Here is one example of why the 
distinction matters. In 2015, a Texas legislator proposed a bill that would 
have criminalized the filming of police officers by non-media.  The bill 
would have amended the criminal code to say that it is a crime to film, record, 
photograph, or document a police officer on duty within 25 feet of the 
officer.13 If the only purpose of the First Amendment were to protect the 
ability of civilians to capture footage of officers, then it might not be that 
troublesome to say, listen, if you’re going to film a police officer you have to 
stand 25 feet away.  But if we recognize that to visibly hold up a recording 
device in front of a police officer is expression in the moment, then 25 feet 
might be too much.  Identifying filming as an act of expression can make all 
the difference in the analysis of a law such as the proposed one in Texas.  
(Note that the argument I am making is just about the initial on/off switch of 
whether something is protected conduct under the First Amendment. If it is 
protected conduct, you would then have to determine which level of scrutiny 
to apply to a government action, and engage in the appropriate balancing.) 
The Fields Court actually got the First Amendment right to record wrong 
in two different ways. The first error of Fields is that the Court disagreed with 
the First and Seventh circuits, and other courts that have found that filming 
the police in public is protected conduct because it is preparatory to speech.  
But the Fields court also made a second error, which is to miss the fact – and 
fail to even address the argument – that recording is an act of resistance in 
itself.  You cannot divorce the act of taking out a camera and filming a police 
officer from the current situation that we are in today, in which filming police 
officers has become an important symbolic act and a crucial tool of opposing 
police brutality more broadly.  I believe that Fields will remain an outlier, 
and that in two decades from now it will be clearly established in every 
jurisdiction in America that there is a First Amendment right to record the 
police.  As the jurisprudence develops, my hope is that courts will begin to 
recognize the expressive dimension of the act of recording – a dimension 
 
 11.  City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987). 
 12.  For an extended argument along these lines, see Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body 
Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2016). 
 13.  H.B. 2918, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
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crucial not just to understanding the act, but to protecting it under the 
Constitution as well. 
 
